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Prototyping Usable Privacy and Security Systems: Insights from Experts
Florian Mathis a,b, Kami Vaniea b, and Mohamed Khamis a
aSchool of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, Scotland, UK; bThe School of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
ABSTRACT
Iterative design, implementation, and evaluation of prototype systems is a common approach in 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) and Usable Privacy and Security (USEC); however, research involving 
physical prototypes can be particularly challenging. We report on twelve interviews with established and 
nascent USEC researchers who prototype security and privacy-protecting systems and have published 
work in top-tier venues. Our interviewees range from professors to senior PhD candidates, and 
researchers from industry. We discussed their experiences conducting USEC research that involves 
prototyping, opinions on the challenges involved, and the ecological validity issues surrounding current 
evaluation approaches. We identify the challenges faced by researchers in this area such as the high 
costs of conducting field studies when evaluating hardware prototypes, the scarcity of open-source 
material, and the resistance to novel prototypes. We conclude with a discussion of how the USEC 
community currently supports researchers in overcoming these challenges and places to potentially 
improve support.
1. Introduction
Prototyping is an integral part of human-centered research 
and design (Fallman, 2003; Ogunyemi et al., 2019; Wobbrock 
& Kientz, 2016). Wobbrock and Kientz (2016) argue that one 
of the main types of research contributions in Human- 
computer Interaction (HCI) is artifact contributions: where 
researchers design inventive prototypes, such as new systems, 
tools and techniques that demonstrate novel forward-looking 
possibilities, or generate new insights through implementing 
and evaluating the prototypes (e.g., (Baudisch et al., 2006; 
Greenberg & Fitchett, 2001; Ishii & Ullmer, 1998; Lopes 
et al., 2017, 2018)). Usable Privacy and Security (USEC) 
research is not an exception. USEC researchers have brought 
forth a plethora of novel usable privacy and security systems 
that extended state-of-the-art and facilitated new insights 
(e.g., (Hayashi et al., 2012; Krombholz et al., 2016; De Luca 
et al., 2014; De Luca, Von Zezschwitz, Nguyen et al., 2013)) – 
some of which found their way to wider adoption, such as 
PassPoints, Pass-Go and DAS which inspired Android’s lock 
patterns (Jermyn et al., 1999; Tao & Adams, 2008; 
Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). At the same time, USEC researchers 
have argued for the importance of human-centered design 
since the 1970’s, when Saltzer and Schroeder (1975) outlined 
that security protection mechanisms require “psychological 
acceptability.” This position was taken further by researchers 
from both the security and HCI communities (Adams & 
Sasse, 1999; Whitten & Tygar, 1999; Zurko & Simon, 1996).
Conducting research that involves prototyping comes with 
unique challenges, such as hardware deployments in ecologi-
cally valid contexts and evaluations with adequate sample 
sizes, that hinder its undertaking. Our work provides: 1) the 
first interview-based insight into the challenges faced by 
USEC experts when designing, implementing, evaluating and 
also publicizing research that is based on prototyping usable 
privacy and security systems, and 2) ways forward to support 
research in this direction on both the individual researcher 
and the wider community level. We interviewed twelve expert 
and nascent USEC researchers from academia and industry 
who have made significant contributions to USEC research 
and whose work involved prototyping novel systems to unveil 
and better understand their research challenges. Our intervie-
wees include full/associate/assistant professors, researchers 
from large tech companies, consultants, and senior PhD can-
didates. Our work tackles the following two research 
questions:
• RQ1: Where, if any, are the bottlenecks USEC experts 
face when designing, implementing, and evaluating 
usable privacy and security prototype systems?
• RQ2: What does the USEC community need to better 
facilitate the transition of artifact contributions into 
practice?
We present 9 key challenges impeding artifact contribu-
tions in USEC, including challenges that have not seen in- 
depth discussion in prior literature, e.g., the implementation 
challenges due to scarcity of open-source material; difficulties 
conducting ecologically valid studies, especially when evaluat-
ing hardware usable privacy and security solutions; and the 
lack of publication venues where novel evaluated USEC sys-
tems are encouraged. We propose five ways the USEC com-
munity can support overcoming these challenges, such as 
encouraging collaborations between academia, industry and 
across research groups, being open to novel evaluated 
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solutions, and encouraging development of new methodolo-
gies to cope with high costs of ecologically valid field studies 
and the shortcomings of lab studies.
We aim to raise awareness of the existing challenges and 
start a critical discussion and self-reflection on how the USEC 
community operates, provoke change in how the community 
addresses work that involves prototyping USEC systems, and 
discuss our experts’ voiced challenges in the light of neighbor-
ing communities such as HCI, Mobile HCI, Ubicomp. The 
insights from USEC experts coupled with the in-depth dis-
cussions presented in this work should be valuable to the 
USEC community as well as neighboring communities.
2. Background & related work
The term “usable privacy and security research” refers to 
research that touches both on human-factors work such as 
human-computer interaction, design, and user experience as 
well as on privacy and security issues such as user authentica-
tion, e-mail security, anti-phishing, web privacy, mobile 
security/privacy, and social media privacy. Because the 
research is by its nature interdisciplinary, it inherits the 
research approaches and challenges from all areas it touches 
on. For example, many of the research methodologies are 
drawn from the HCI community (Garfinkel & Lipford, 
2014) which has a rich history in user-based research. Yet, 
many approaches need to be adapted to handle the sensitive 
nature of security and privacy work. For example, finding 
ways to study ATM PIN entry in a way that does not break 
laws, endanger participants, or leak sensitive data while also 
ensuring the evaluation is ecologically valid are all challenging 
(De Luca et al., 2010; Volkamer et al., 2018). As a result, 
privacy and security researchers struggle with getting access 
to “real” user data or need to spend significant additional 
effort. In this paper, we aim to identify the set of challenges 
that are particularly problematic to the subset of the USEC 
community that conducts prototyping-related research.
2.1. USEC research and its challenges
Past efforts have organized existing research in particular 
domains within USEC. Iachello and Hong (2007) outlined 
approaches, results, and trends in research on privacy in 
HCI. In their work, they analyzed academic and industrial 
literature published between 1977 and 2007. They described 
some legal foundations and historical aspects of privacy, 
which included designing, implementing, and evaluating priv-
acy-affecting systems. Work by Acar et al. (2016) reviewed 
state-of-the-art USEC research that typically focused on end- 
users, and laid out an agenda to support software developers. 
A more general review of USEC research by Garfinkel and 
Lipford (2014) covered the state of USEC research in 2014, 
and suggested future research directions. Their work high-
lighted that “only by simultaneously addressing both usability 
and security concerns will we be able to build systems that are 
truly secure” (Garfinkel & Lipford, 2014, p.vi), emphasizing 
the need for novel well-evaluated systems that address both 
security and usability from the beginning of the design 
process.
Alt and Von Zezschwitz (2019) highlighted the need to 
develop study paradigms for collecting data while minimizing 
the required effort for both participants and researchers. Alt 
and Von Zezschwitz (2019) and Bianchi and Oakley (2016) 
also underlined that the fast pace of emerging technologies 
(e.g., wearables such as smart glasses and smart watches) 
comes with novel challenges that require rapid adaptions of 
user-centered usability, security, and privacy research. For 
example, while wearable devices can enable novel authentica-
tion techniques (e.g., (Chun et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2018), they 
also require researchers to adjust their research methods to 
consider new contexts and privacy implications (Bianchi & 
Oakley, 2016). The book by Garfinkel and Lipford (2014) 
dedicates three pages (pp. 4–6) in the intro to discussing 
challenges that make USEC research hard, including chal-
lenges around conducting ecologically valid studies due to 
priming caused by the study itself and challenges around 
designing in the presence of an adversary that is actively 
attempting to attack the user. USEC research has also been 
previously found to be challenging because security is often 
not users’ primary task (A. M. Sasse et al., 2001). Studying 
sensitive and private contexts often also requires additional 
effort and resources due to ethical and legal constraints, as 
highlighted in prior work (De Luca et al., 2010; Trowbridge 
et al., 2018).
While the works above provide valuable observations, most 
of them are drawn either from a single study or a review of 
written works. Their focus is also often on capturing the 
current state of the field or providing structured book-like 
observations for students. Work that captures common opi-
nions and “hallway chatter” among USEC researchers that is 
typically less structured are more rare. One of the few works 
in this direction is a work by M. A. Sasse et al. (2016) which 
reports on a record of a conversation among experts about the 
usability-security trade-off. These works are valuable because 
they capture the attitudes of practitioners in the field in 
a more candid way. Our work aims to provide this kind of 
“hallway knowledge” view of the challenges faced by USEC 
researchers who design, develop, and evaluate prototypes.
2.2. A glance at USEC’s prototyping challenges
Building and testing prototypes is a common approach in 
USEC when the specifics of a design are likely to impact 
how users interact with it. Prototyping is commonly used in 
areas like authentication where the physical design of the 
input mechanism can have a large impact on a user’s input 
speed and accuracy as well as an attacker’s ability to remotely 
view and replicate their actions. We use the range of USEC’s 
prototypes that we discuss below to provide readers with an 
idea about the available prototype systems in USEC research. 
Note that people often have different expectations of what 
a prototype is. As a result, finding one definition that covers 
all different research fields and prototype variants is 
challenging.
Everyone has a different expectation of what a prototype is. [. . .] Is 
a brick a prototype? The answer depends on how it is used. If it is 
used to represent the weight and scale of some future artifact, then 
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it certainly is: it prototypes the weight and scale of the artifact. - 
(Houde & Hill, 1997, p. 368) 
While we are not aware of an existing overview of prototyping 
challenges in USEC, several researchers have commented on 
specific challenges they faced when designing and testing 
USEC-related prototypes. Reilly et al. (2014) presented 
a software toolkit for USEC research in mixed reality colla-
borative environments and emphasized that complex proto-
types can be difficult to set up correctly. They also argued that 
their toolkit was limited by the functionalities of the base 
platform they used (i.e., Open Wonderland1). Zeng and 
Roesner (2019) built a prototype smart home app to find 
answers to how a smart home should be designed to address 
multi-user security and privacy challenges and what security 
and privacy behaviors smart home users exhibit in practice. In 
their work, they identified challenges introduced by their used 
SmartThings API. Activity notifications could not be used to 
attribute changes in the home state to particular third-party 
apps. Other limitations were introduced by the underlying 
operating system. Persistent low priority notifications were 
only implemented on Android but not on iOS as the notifica-
tion center did not support these notifications (Zeng & 
Roesner, 2019). Other works reported that their prototype 
limitations resulted in lower ecological validity. Hundlani 
et al. (2017), for example, stated that their prototypes were 
created for research purposes only and were not on the level 
of finished products.
When it comes to hardware prototypes, USEC researchers 
have reported a variety of additional challenges. Physical pro-
totypes are often made in research labs and therefore are 
physical approximations rather than professionally designed 
products, which can lead to confounds around usability. For 
example, using two connected mobile phones to provide users 
with a back and front display for user authentication enabled 
testing of the idea, but at the same time negatively impacted 
users’ authentication experience due to the prototype’s weight 
(De Luca, von Zezschwitz, Nguyen et al., 2013). The work by 
Chen et al. (2020) showed that achieving a form factor similar 
to the original product can be technically challenging. Their 
wearable jammer to protect users’ privacy was indeed larger 
than a typical bracelet. Other work reported that the form 
factor of their privacy-protecting prototype was not perceived 
well by users (Perez et al., 2018). Prototypes are also often 
built using existing hardware and software which can limit the 
range of what they can accurately do. Mhaidli et al. (2020), for 
example, built a smart speaker prototype but encountered 
robustness issues with their Kinect camera when tracking 
users’ eye movements. In a similar vein, Schaub et al. (2014) 
faced reliability issues with their presence detection and iden-
tification system, which likely resulted in more conservative 
privacy settings than preferred by their participants.
The challenges mentioned above are likely only a small 
percentage of the types of problems USEC researchers face 
when designing, developing, and evaluating prototypes. We 
aim to expand on these existing observations about prototyp-
ing challenges by talking with researchers about their experi-
ences and challenges that may be well known in the 
community, but are not necessarily reported in publications.
2.3. Contribution over prior work
In this work we present an overview of challenges faced by 
experts who design, develop, and evaluate prototypes as part 
of their USEC-related research. While other works have 
touched on what makes USEC research challenging in gen-
eral, and individual works have commented on challenges 
they have faced in completing their research, there has not 
yet been a structured attempt to elicit challenges experienced 
by USEC researchers that use prototypes in their work. In this 
work we put forward such a compilation of experienced 
challenges.
Such a compilation is valuable and novel, and it also sits 
within the wider contexts of the HCI, security, and privacy 
fields. Some of our identified challenges have been identified 
previously, for example, the challenge of finding research 
participants is well known in HCI. However, we argue that 
there is value in compiling the set of challenges that most 
impact USEC researchers and to put these challenges into 
a USEC context. For example, USEC makes heavy use of 
deception studies where the participant is told that the study 
is about, say, testing a social networking site, but the research 
is actually about authentication or privacy. The use of decep-
tion makes it impossible to re-use participants, so the well 
known HCI challenge of finding participants has a particular 
shape in USEC work. In this paper we present the challenges 
faced by our participants and how those challenges manifested 
in their research.
3. Methodology
This section describes our recruiting process, the structure of 
our interviews, our research approach and analysis, and some 
potential limitations of our work.
3.1. Recruiting USEC Experts
We completed an ethical review through the University of 
Glasgow College of Science & Engineering Ethics Committee 
in advance of participant recruitment. Potential interviewees 
were selected with the goal of obtaining a mix of researchers 
and practitioners who are experienced in USEC; thus, work at 
the intersection of HCI and security & privacy research. We 
sought those who both published works and had hands-on 
experience in the design, implementation, and evaluation of 
usable privacy and security systems. To compose a list of 
potential interviewees, we started with a rough literature 
review to identify authors and then added people we knew 
about already in the area to fill out the list. We searched the 
ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, and Google Scholar to 
find scholars with published USEC work at highly ranked 
HCI and security venues (e.g., ACM CHI, USENIX SOUPS, 
IEEE S&P). We started with broad search terms like “usable 
security,” “usable privacy” that formed the basis of our search 
and then followed-up with more specific search terms that are 
relevant for our research: “security prototype,” “privacy proto-
type.” We then reviewed papers to identify those that included 
building a security and/or privacy-protection solution and 
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a user-centered evaluation. To further improve our coverage, 
we also used a snowball approach: the references in the papers 
were reviewed for relevant titles and added to the list of 
reviewed publications. We used Google Scholar and dblp to 
determine the publication profile and experience of the iden-
tified authors in the area. Relevant identified publications 
were recorded for later use in the interviews. From this 
process we identified a pool of 56 potential interviewees 
who have significant expertise in usable privacy and security 
and prototyping. We sorted the list with an eye toward multi-
ple variables: selecting people with a range of seniority, uni-
versity, industry, country, research domain, and experience 
publishing systems solution papers in USEC venues. 
Researchers who were more senior and had recent USEC 
prototype publications were ranked higher.
We then sent invitations (see template in Appendix A) 
asking if the person was willing to be interviewed about 
their research. Although recruiting senior people is time- 
consuming and challenging, we were able to secure fourteen 
responses (70%) from twenty invitations. Two then declined 
due to unavailability, the remaining twelve agreed to partici-
pate. Eleven interviews took place via Skype and were audio 
and video recorded with consent. One preferred an e-mail 
interview, which is a viable alternative (Meho, 2006). As we 
progressed through the interviews, few novel insights emerged 
after the tenth interview. We continued with two more inter-
views and observed nothing new in the twelfth (theoretical 
saturation) (Guest et al., 2006). We, therefore, decided not to 
send out additional interview requests.
�
3.1.1. Demographics of the USEC experts and interview 
material
Our final sample had 12 USEC experts (4 females, 8 males). 
Our interviewees are from the US, Europe, and Asia, and 
work in academia (6), industry (2), or in both academia and 
industry (4). At the time of the interviews, 10 interviewees 
held a PhD (1 full professor/4 associate professors/1 assistant 
professor/1 adjunct professor & security research scientist/1 
user experience researcher/1 USEC research engineer/1 
research fellow). We also included two senior PhD candidates 
who had published usable privacy and security research in 
top-tier venues and received best paper awards. Their 
inclusion widened the covered spectrum as they had more 
recent hands-on experience in implementing systems and 
conducting user-centered evaluations. All interviewees 
worked in the broader field of usable privacy and security 
including, but not limited to, user authentication, anti- 
phishing efforts, mobile security and privacy, and web priv-
acy. Our interviewed experts have on average 123.42 publica-
tions (max = 386, min = 18, SD = 129.81), 3740.75 citations 
(max = 14,627, min = 25, SD = 4857.28), and an h-index of 
22.5 (max = 56, min = 3, SD = 16.69). All reported numbers 
(i.e., publications, citations, h-index) involve all kinds of pub-
lications, including usable privacy and security works. We 
report the overall numbers because all publications eventually 
contribute to a researcher’s h-index, and extracting the num-
ber of USEC-specific papers in a precise way is challenging. 
The final set of publications (N = 27) used to setup context 
during interviews ranged from 2010 to 2019 (Md = 2018). Out 
of the 27 publications used in the interviews, 14 papers com-
prise software-based prototype systems and 9 comprise hard-
ware components. We also used four additional USEC papers 
from experts we interviewed, three of which are considered to 
be highly influential in USEC and the fourth one reports on 
research on an in-the-wild deployed security system. One of 
these additional publications discussed, for example, the last 
decade of usable security prototype systems and outlined 
learned lessons when developing and evaluating USEC proto-
types. Table 1 shows an overview of our participants in an 
anonymized form.
3.2. Interview structure
We conducted semi-structured interviews informed by the 
content of the interviewees’ publications which the inter-
viewer familiarized themselves with in advance. All publica-
tions were drawn from the initial literature review that we 
used for our sampling procedure, outlined in Section 3.1. The 
corresponding publications were then used as example papers 
and we attached them to the initial e-mail request (see Figure 
A1 in Appendix A). This allowed us to efficiently use the 
interviewees’ time and add context to their opinions. This 
also facilitated detailed discussions, allowing the interviewee 
to explore examples and the interviewer to ask informed 
follow up questions. We chose semi-structured interviews 
Table 1. Our interviewees have published a significant number of work (xpub = 123.42) that is highly cited (xcite = 3740.75). Note that the data reported is from early 
2020.
Anonymized
Participants� Publications Citations h-index Job title Academia Industry
P1 [0,50] [0,100] [0,5] PhD candidate ✓ ✘
P2 [50,100] [2.500,5.000] > 30 User Experience Researcher ✘ ✘
P3 [100,250] [2.500,5.000] > 30 Associate Professor ✓ ✘
P4 [0,50] [100,250] > 5 PhD candidate & UX Researcher ✓ ✓
P5 [0,50] [100,250] > 5 USEC Research Engineer ✘ ✓
P6 [50,100] [500,1.000] > 10 Assoc. Prof. & UX Researcher ✓ ✓
P7 [0,50] [0,100] > 5 Research Fellow in USEC ✓ ✘
P8 [250,500] [10.000,20.000] > 50 Full Professor ✓ ✓
P9 [100,250] [2.500,5.000] > 25 Associate Professor ✓ ✘
P10 [50,100] [1.000,2.500] > 15 Associate Professor ✓ ✘
P11 [0,50] [1.000,2.500] > 10 Assistant Professor ✓ ✘
P12 [250,500] [10.000,20.000] > 50 Adj. Prof. & Security Research Scientist ✓ ✓





*To protect experts’ identities, we mention here intervals for the number of publications, citations, and h-index. 
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because they allowed us to ask the same high-level questions 
to all participants, and also ask follow up questions and 
encourage participants to discuss their past experiences. All 
interviews covered the following questions, and follow up 
questions were prepared and used if needed (see full list in 
Appendix B):
3.2.1. Typical research journey from idea to publication
The purpose of this question was to understand how the 
interviewee normally progresses from a research idea to 
publication(s), and how that progression occurs within their 
broader research community. Journeys typically included 
topics such as: idea generation, resources, prototype develop-
ment, idea refinement, evaluation, publication.
3.2.2. Research challenges and limitations
We asked our interviewees about the challenges they faced in 
conducting research that involved implemented solutions and 
their opinion about the more general challenges and limita-
tions of USEC research that includes prototyping.
3.2.3. The ecological validity of current evaluations
We collected insights on different study types that our USEC 
experts employed. We also aimed to understand obstacles to 
conducting fully ecological valid evaluations. Inspired by 
recent work that argued for developing novel methodologies 
to understand and design for emerging technologies and 
mitigate new threats (Alt & Von Zezschwitz, 2019; Garfinkel 
& Lipford, 2014), we asked our experts whether or not they 
see the current evaluation approaches of the USEC commu-
nity as the way to go in the future or if they would prefer to 
see alternative evaluation approaches.
Finally, we debriefed our interviewees, asked them if they 
have any final questions or thoughts, and concluded with an 
informal chat. Interviews lasted 48.5 minutes on average. We 
offered all interviewees an £8 online shopping voucher. Some 
of them waived the compensation due to different reasons 
(e.g., donate it, keep it for other research projects).
3.3. Research approach and data analysis
We applied open coding followed by thematic analysis 
inspired by Grounded Theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2014) on 
our interview data. We decided to a) apply open coding to 
build the insights and key challenges directly from the raw 
data of our expert interviews, and b) use a thematic analysis 
inspired by Grounded Theory (Corbin & Strauss, 2014) to 
uncover the main concerns and challenges of experts in the 
field of USEC when prototyping usable privacy and security 
systems. We also conducted an initial literature review prior 
to the interviews to better understand the research area and 
line up potential interviewees (as previously described in 
Section 3.1), who we then contacted by e-mail. Doing this 
enabled us to familiarize ourselves with the expert’s works and 
access a promising USEC sample for our investigation and 
research questions (Hoda et al., 2011). For the data collection, 
we conducted semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions. While interviews were ongoing, two authors reg-
ularly met to discuss 1) the notes taken by the interviewer 
about interesting observations and thoughts that emerged 
during the interviews and 2) the publications associated with 
upcoming interviews. These meetings allowed the researchers 
to regularly reflect on the findings and keep those points in 
mind in further interviews. Once all the interviews were 
completed, the lead author transcribed all audio recordings 
and open coded the transcriptions. The initial open coding 
scope was drawn from the regular discussion meetings and 
the lead researcher also took Memos (Saldaña, 2015) when 
conducting the open coding. A second researcher went 
through the interview raw data and added additional 
Memos. This process generated 325 open codes and 93 
memos. The lead author then organized all codes and printed 
those out to have a paper-based piece for each code. Two 
authors then conducted a paper-based affinity diagram of the 
open codes (Kawakita, 1991). The transcript, Memos, and 
audio were revisited when additional information about 
a code’s context was needed. The authors organized the 
codes into groups which were then further refined into 
themes.
In summary, we went through an initial literature review to 
compose a list of potential interviewees and followed with 
semi-structured interviews to collect USEC experts’ opinions 
and insights that we then transcribed and further analyzed 
(Hoda et al., 2011). We present the themes, experts’ voiced 
comments, and the key challenges when prototyping usable 
privacy and security systems in Section 4 and tie our findings 
with previous literature in an in-depth discussion in Section 5.
3.4. Limitations
While the approaches we use are common in human-centered 
and usable privacy and security research, some of our specific 
decisions have limitations to keep in mind. First, we selected 
experienced researchers who have been successful in publish-
ing works involving prototypes in USEC venues. Their experi-
ence is valuable, but it is also biased toward those who 
ultimately succeeded in publishing. The challenges faced by 
those who tried and failed to conduct this type of research due 
to issues such as lack of mentorship, or choosing too challen-
ging of problems are therefore not well represented here. 
Additionally, we aimed to talk to USEC researchers who 
have been successful and have been through a range of fail-
ures, which is an accompanying element when being success-
ful in academia.2 Although our sample also includes more 
junior researchers (e.g., P1, P7), we encourage future work to 
look into a sample of junior researchers only and compare 
their thoughts and opinions on USEC’s prototyping chal-
lenges to the ones reported in our work. Moreover, interviews 
with experts in USEC on a research and community level 
might not have captured all sides of the conversation; for 
example, the views of entities such as research institutions 
and funding agencies are not covered. We leave this to future 
work. Our participants were also likely biased by the publica-
tions we selected and sent to them in advance of the interview. 
Pre-selecting publications helped both the interviewer and the 
interviewees scope the interviews in a time-productive man-
ner. But the scoping also likely had an impact on the topics 
interviewees chose to discuss. Four of the participants, two 
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pairs, had coauthored papers in our reviewed paper set. Given 
the seniority of some participants and the size of the field, 
such a situation is expected. However, we were careful not to 
use the same publication in more than one interview session 
to ensure that experts’ voiced comments do not revolve 
around the same publications. Finally, interviews were also 
retrospective in nature, focusing on past experience and opi-
nions about the area. While retrospective interviews can be 
quite effective for learning about rare events or those that take 
place over a long time period, they also suffer from a bias 
toward memorable events. Our interviewees described pro-
jects where the initial idea generation was sometimes years in 
the past likely resulting in some issues of memory bias.
4. Results
Below, we present our key findings: 1) threat modeling, 2) proto-
typing USEC systems, 3) sample size and selection, 4) evalua-
tions, 5) USEC’s research culture, and 6) USEC’s real-world 
impact. Protecting expert participant anonymity is challenging 
(Saunders et al., 2015; Scott, 2005; Van den Hoonaard, 2003), so 
we refer to interviewees using a participant number (P1 to P12) 
and use they for all participants. In advance of presenting each key 
challenge, we use short preambles to set the frame of the challenge 
and introduce readers to the topic.
4.1. Threat modeling is not straight forward
Threat modeling is commonly used in privacy and security 
research to describe the assumed skills and capabilities of an 
attacker. Many input and feedback methods can be observed by 
bystanders, which led to a lot of emphasis on shoulder surfing in 
the past (Bošnjak & Brumen, 2020). Shoulder surfing attacks, for 
example, often assume that the attacker can get physically close to 
the user or has an observation device like a camera. The consid-
ered threat impacts the design and evaluation of usable privacy 
and security prototypes because researchers need to consider said 
threats in the design and development process. While there are 
many different threats including, for example, social engineering 
attacks (Krombholz et al., 2015) and online/offline guessing 
attacks (Gong et al., 1993), shoulder surfing as a threat model as 
studied by, for example, Brudy et al. (2014), De Luca et al. (2009), 
George et al. (2019), and Mathis et al. (2020), was particularly 
discussed by several experts who exhibited a range of opinions 
about what constitutes a “realistic” threat model. Many of the 
interviewed experts focused on authentication research in the 
past, which is not surprising given that authentication has been 
a major theme in USEC research with Garfinkel and Lipford 
(2014) spending 27 pages on the subject compared to 10 on 
phishing. Consequently, the example of shoulder surfing threat 
models was brought up several times in reference to how threat 
models, prototype systems, and study designs can interact. Our 
expert interviews revealed two opposing opinions regarding valid 
threat models that address security, which we discuss below.
P5 argued that the relevance of shoulder surfing attacks 
depends heavily on the context, and explained that the threat 
has different implications in different countries and that these 
attacks definitely scare them.
in the U.S. as well as in Europe you may not really feel [that] 
shoulder surfing attacks are something that you should really care 
about [...]. In over-populated countries like India you have a lot of 
people [. . .] when you go to an ATM machine or to places like 
coffee shops [. . .] there are like three people standing right behind 
you. [In these cases,] shoulder surfing is a really big problem. - P5 
Taken together, P5 voiced that cultural differences in perceived 
personal space impact susceptibility to shoulder surfing (Remland 
et al., 1995). In a simialr vein, P8 outlined that such attacks are 
actually realistic in the real world and further argued that 
researchers have to consider both, user concerns as well as the 
point of view of experts to accurately assess the value and validity 
of certain threats.
If you actually keep asking the users about what they are worried 
about; often they are less worried about the NSA and more 
worried about their parents/their partner. - P8 
However, even if a threat model seems to be appropriate for 
a given context and is of particular importance to end-users, 
experts had different opinions on the value of specific threat 
models and some mentioned that shoulder surfing attacks are 
overrated and uninteresting.
“shoulder surfing is a problem, but it’s hugely overblown.” – P9  
Fundamentally for me the problem with observation attacks is, 
[they] are not that interesting from a security point of view, it’s 
a real niche attack [. . .] [researchers] report performance against 
observation attacks with a very narrow threat model: ‘can you see 
it’; which is incredibly, it’s very very narrow. - P3 
P2 emphasized the problem that there is no common agreement 
among USEC experts regarding the validity of specific threat 
models.
[researchers] think they use the worst case scenario, but actually 
they did not. - P2 
P7 further described the threat modeling challenges using 
shoulder surfing as an example and emphasized that there is 
a clear mismatch between researchers’ assumptions and the 
reality and that it is important to consider social norms when 
studying threat models because “people move closer than 
[researchers] actually thought they ever would, or they stay 
further away because they respect people’s social norms”(P7).
4.2. Prototyping USEC systems
Prototyping is an integral part of human-centered research and 
design (Fallman, 2003; Wobbrock & Kientz, 2016), one of the 
main types of research contributions in HCI research (Wobbrock 
& Kientz, 2016), as well as a major theme in USEC research 
(Garfinkel & Lipford, 2014). We observed themes around the 
hardware challenges when building usable privacy and security 
KEY CHALLENGE #1
Experts’ opinions regarding the value of specific threat models vary widely. A
good threat model needs to match the contextual realities of users, but those
realities are not always known or may only impact a specific subset of users,
making threat modeling a non-trivial part of research.
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prototypes (4.2.1) and around the deployment and corresponding 
evaluation challenges (4.2.2).
4.2.1. Development & hardware challenges
Experts voiced that developing usable privacy and security 
prototype systems is challenging and costly, partially due to 
limited access to appropriate hardware and the limited pro-
totyping expertise of USEC researchers.
I think we actually really need more collaborations between the 
usable security people and the people who are fairly close to 
building [hardware prototypes]. - P8 
P1 voiced that they faced issues with the eye tracker due to, 
for example, inappropriate lighting conditions. They also 
reported that the interplay between multiple hardware com-
ponents caused them some issues and that this resulted in 
significant more effort, additional pilot tests, and in excluding 
data from the actual user study.
I combined [the hardware] all together [. . .] and then [faced] 
issues [. . .] because they are all working with infrared and [oper-
ate] on the same wave length. - P1 
If you recruit 50 participants [. . .] you have to discard five to ten 
participants because the eye tracker is not working. - P1 
Our experts also voiced that these limitations lead to many 
prototype systems “[that] were made very quickly [and] are 
not well made” (P3) or that hardware is used inappropriately, 
threatening ecological validity.
We slapped the phone on [a user’s] wrist and put a little active 
part in a corner, so it was sort of a like big wrist watch but it was 
not usable [. . .] the validity of using a phone on users’ wrist is 
relatively low. - P3 
Experts attested that the lack of appropriate hardware, par-
tially due to a lack of funding, is a fundamental problem.
Usually we do not have funding to buy new equipment [. . .] then 
we have to come up with ideas of how we can build that hard-
ware.”- P4 
P2 mentioned that such bottlenecks have a noticeable impact 
on USEC research with their prototype being significantly 
heavier than mobile devices at that time.
A lot of negative feedback in those evaluations was around the 
weight of the prototype [. . .] [the weight] made it more difficult to 
use [the prototype]. - P2 
Some experts even mentioned that they had to adjust their 
research projects due to the lack of appropriate research 
equipment.
We try to have as fast as we can the first prototype and see what 
are the challenges from the development side because often we 
need to alter the project to fit to the equipment we have. - P4 
Other experts further mentioned that setting up hardware 
components at their intended place can be challenging and 
that these physical restrictions often force them to come up 
with alternative solutions: “I didn’t really manage to put [the 
front camera] exactly in the middle because the eye tracker was 
[already] there” (P1).
4.2.2. Deployment & evaluation challenges
When it comes to the evaluation of USEC prototypes and 
conducting research that goes beyond in-lab investigations, 
experts explained they had a hard time in evaluating their 
systems and that there are a lot of issues around deployability, 
especially in the case of using new hardware. Although USEC 
experts strive for real-world deployments to increase ecologi-
cal validity, P4 still sees the transferability of findings to users’ 
everyday life as one of the major problems.
The major problem with evaluating privacy and security systems 
is that how can you visualize that the users are acting the way they 
would act if they would [use] it in their everyday life. - P4 
P2 further voiced that deploying their prototype to a large 
sample was impossible and explained the situation with hav-
ing access to only one device.
There’s a lot of issues around deployability, specifically when it 
comes to using new hardware [. . .] the deployment was impossible 
[. . .] we had one device and that device we could hand out to one 
person at a time. - P2 
When using new hardware, our interviewees also highlighted 
that the cost of failure might be high and that it is important 
to invest only in equipment that is likely to become publicly 
available in the future and provides promising future use 
cases. P2 further highlighted the noticeable impact of limited 
deployable hardware on research. As a result, P2 voiced that 
they were not able to run a memorability study.
We did not run a memorability study [for our authentication 
scheme] mainly due to hardware issues [. . .] the magical formula 
would be having an infrastructure that allows to [build hardware- 
based prototypes] in a very quick way. - P2 
In summary, experts reported that research involving hard-
ware prototypes often introduces additional challenges. 
Besides the hardware challenges, many of the challenges 
voiced by the experts are the result of limited access to 
appropriate resources and lack of funding, which we discuss 
further in the context of USEC’s research culture in 
Section 4.5.3.
4.3. Sample size and selection process
Sample concerns, especially discussions around the appropri-
ate size of a sample and its characteristics, are highly domi-
nant when conducting experiments and frequently discussed 
in the HCI (Caine, 2016) and USEC community (Redmiles 
et al., 2017).
4.3.1. Small sample sizes
Our interviewees highlighted the importance of collecting 
large datasets, especially for security evaluations. P3, for 
example, described the problem with the pool of real-world 
KEY CHALLENGE #2
Experts voiced that evaluations of USEC systems are expensive and often in-
feasible to do in an ecologically valid way, especially when they are large-scale
and require special equipment or hardware-prototyping experience.
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passwords which is significantly larger compared to a small 
subset of passwords collected from user studies: “there’s 
70 million from a cracked database, you got six and a half 
thousand – that’s like a drop in the ocean” (P3). P3 also argued 
that prototype evaluations with small datasets cannot be used 
to assess security.
[we] have got 12-20 users [. . .] the security data is of no value and 
the conclusion is that there is no value inside the small sample 
size. - P3 
Across all experts there was a consensus that the sample size 
and selection is a fundamental and ongoing challenge that 
goes beyond USEC. P11 repeatedly emphasized the challenge 
with achieving large sample sizes: “finding a large sample size 
is really hard” (P11). While small sample sizes are problematic 
as pointed out by P3, external factors (e.g., access to different 
research environments) can have a notable impact on the 
sampling process and the resulting sample size. P11, for 
example, voiced that they face significant issues when recruit-
ing participants and that their resources are limited.
I recently moved to another country and I was really happy to get 
25 [participants] [. . .] I was really happy to get them but well . . . 
- P11 
Throughout the interview, P11 further voiced that for some 
researchers such a sample is too small and immediately inva-
lidates the conducted research, but that they often overlook 
the still valuable research and its contributions. P1 voiced that 
the lack of participants is one of their main research problems 
and that it is often challenging to convince potential partici-
pants to come to the lab.
4.3.2. Biased recruitment
Additionally to the sample size concerns above, there were 
discussions and concerns about the recruitment process – the 
way in which researchers recruit participants for their studies.
[sample size and selection] is one of the largest outstanding 
problems with all HCI systems work which is that we evaluate 
[our systems] by knocking on the doors of friends and colleagues 
and be like ‘hey, come do my user study and I’ll give you $10.’ 
- P11 
P7 echoed the problem of evaluations using experimenters’ 
social circles and that it is often unclear what happens if the 
system is evaluated with a more diverse sample and even with 
people who do not know what privacy is.
We run [studies] within our social circles, what happens if we get 
someone who’s elderly, who’s not familiar with technology, [or] 
who doesn’t even know what privacy is? - P7 
P2 further highlighted that although they have access to 
a gigantic user pool, which is not comparable to the (often) 
limited user pools in academic environments, their user pool 
still runs out and that they still rely on vendors to have access 
to an even larger set of participants.
4.4. Evaluation methodologies
Discussions on the topic of lab and field studies were com-
mon among our participants. We observed themes around the 
importance of both of them (Section 4.4.1), the value/cost 
trade-off (Section 4.4.2), and the perceived value of field 
studies in USEC research (Section 4.4.3).
4.4.1. Importance of lab and field studies
Our experts emphasized the necessity of different evaluation 
approaches, and that starting with lab studies is often 
a prerequisite for evaluating USEC systems.
There’s a place for both [. . .] I don’t think it makes any sense to go 
directly into the field to evaluate new systems when we haven’t 
done any lab studies at all. - P9 
There was an agreement across all experts on: 1) lab studies 
should be conducted before going into the field and 2) the 
potential of field studies to lead to ecologically valid findings. 
Experts also voiced that researchers should not underestimate 
the importance of lab studies. P11, for example, highlighted 
that different study types come with different pros and cons 
and that imperfect evaluations of usable privacy and security 
prototypes can still be valid contributions to the research 
community.
We can have ideas – that’s the strength of academia – ideas that 
are totally radical and new and not going to be evaluated perfectly 
in the context of a lab study [. . .] but that doesn’t mean they don’t 
have value [or] can’t inspire the direction of the usable security 
and privacy future. - P11 
P7 further emphasized the importance of taking prototypes 
out of the lab and putting them into real environments. Other 
experts mentioned that real-world investigations have 
a particular importance as participants manifest “demand 
characteristics’; they subconsciously change their behavior to 
fit the experimenter’s purpose. P11, for example, highlighted 
the uncertainty about the effect of lab studies on results and 
that they “cannot be sure whether [participants] are acting as 
[they] would act in the wild or if they’ve changed their behavior 
because they know they are being part of a study” (P11).
4.4.2. Value/cost trade-off
The trade-off between effort in applying a methodology (e.g., 
lab vs field study) and the value/ecological validity of the 
corresponding findings was highly discussed by our experts 
and is considered to be a domain challenge in USEC research 
(Garfinkel & Lipford, 2014). Our experts stated that lab stu-
dies are considered simpler than field studies and that this is 
one of the main reasons why we see a plethora of lab studies 
but significantly less field studies in USEC prototyping 
research.
[the] uncharitable view would be that [running lab studies rather 
than field studies] is just easier to do. - P8 
My take is that it’s a mix of convenience, not knowing better, and 
impossibility as in certain [situations] you can’t do [experiments] 
that are difficult to do that it’s not worth the additional effort. - P2 
P9 also voiced that “it’s easier to do a lab study; the odds of 
something going wrong are way too high” (P9). Another expert, 
KEY CHALLENGE #3
Experts voiced that sample size and recruitment are problems across multiple
disciplines and major concerns of USEC research. Small sample sizes and biased
participant selection reduce the value and validity of security evaluations.
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P3, voiced that before conducting field studies it is important 
to compare the value versus the effort.
There is a place for [field studies] but is there enough added value 
in field studies generally that this is important? - P3 
Experts also voiced that field studies can be powerful and it is 
not unlikely that results deviate from lab findings, but 
researchers need to be clear about what they are seeking 
rather than being exploratory. P3 elaborated that “field studies 
can be valuable but there needs to be a clear value [. . .] the 
data will differ from a lab” (P3). Other experts, for example, 
P4, highlighted the strength of field studies as they provide 
insights about how systems are really going to be used and 
how people are going to accept them. On the other hand, P5 
voiced it is hard to pinpoint causes of effects in field studies 
and that achieving accurate results through field studies only 
is challenging.
4.4.3. Experts’ views on field studies in USEC research
Some experts reported believing that “field studies are sort of 
a gold standard” (P11) and that they “would like to see more 
about how security fits into real life as opposed to specific little 
corner cases that are easy to run” (P9). P10 highlighted that 
the suitability of field studies heavily depends on the required 
investigation and the legal and ethical considerations, and that 
this differs a lot between different countries. Experts also 
described some unsuccessful attempts to study prototypes in 
a real-world setting.
We looked at investigating [our security system] within a real 
setting but there were just too many legal and ethical constraints 
around that. - P2 
P6 and P7 added that such field studies are expensive and that 
they often have to rely on findings from lab studies only due 
to budget issues and technological issues they would face in 
field studies.
4.5. USEC’s research culture
Different research fields and individual researchers come with 
different sets of behaviors, values, expectations, attitudes, and 
norms, forming a unique research environment and culture. 
Open science and reproducibility, for example, are recognized 
as vital features of science across research fields and 
considered as a disciplinary norm and value (McNutt, 2014); 
however, in practice there are significant differences across 
research communities. Wacharamanotham et al. (2020) 
showed that the process of sharing artifacts is an uncommon 
practice in the HCI community and Cockburn et al. (2018) 
showed that preregistration has received little to no published 
attention in HCI whereas other research fields (e.g., psychol-
ogy) started to award badges for different categories (e.g., 
“open data,” “preregistration”) (Eich, 2014), with promising 
adoption rates in the first year of operation (Nosek et al., 
2015).
When it comes to USEC and researchers’ behaviors, values, 
expectations, attitudes, and norms, experts mentioned chal-
lenges around the expected, often hard to reach, high ecolo-
gical validity of usable privacy and security prototype 
evaluations (Section 4.5.1), USEC researchers’ reserved enthu-
siastic about novel evaluated systems (Section 4.5.2), and the 
lack of access to research resources (Section 4.5.3). While 
some of these challenges can also be found in neighboring 
research communities (e.g., the lack of access to research 
resources in HCI (Wacharamanotham et al., 2020)), the com-
bination of the challenges and USEC researchers’ opinions 
and their research approaches form a unique research culture.
4.5.1. Toward (high) ecological validity
An important objective in usable privacy and security research is 
to achieve high ecological validity; the extent to which a study 
adequately reflects real-world conditions. A password study by 
Fahl et al. (2013) showed that participants in a lab study behaved 
differently compared to their real-world behavior. Although 
Redmiles et al. (2018) argued that many insights from self- 
report security data can, when used with care, translate to the 
real world, they also emphasized that self-reported data can 
indeed vary from data collected in the field and that alternative 
research methodologies should be considered for studying 
detailed constructs. Some of our experts mentioned that USEC 
researchers often expect high ecological validity and general-
izability of study findings. As a result, they aim to, for example, 
role-play real-world situations in the lab (Fahl et al., 2013), 
conduct field studies (e.g., Harbach, De Luca, Egelman et al., 
2016; Malkin et al., 2017; Mare et al., 2016), or leverage online 
studies to increase sample size and target a more representative 
sample (e.g., (Cheon et al., 2020; Harbach, De Luca, Malkin et al., 
2016; Markert et al., 2020)). However, P12, for example, stated 
that a real-world evaluation of all systems’ usability and security 
aspects is almost impossible: “the difficulty in evaluating system 
security is that the lack of security can have many different 
sources.” (P12). P12 further emphasized the complexity of secur-
ity evaluations.
All secure systems are alike. But there are many different ways for 
a system to be not secure. It is not possible to enumerate them all. 
- P12 
A concern by P1 was about the lack of common evaluation 
approaches and that their set of evaluation metrics (e.g., 
interaction time with a security system, error rate when pro-
viding input) often has to evolve from literature reviews 
because of the lack of any standards. Researchers’ various 
evaluation approaches exacerbate the problem of determining 
KEY CHALLENGE #4
Experts voiced that the choice of evaluation methodology is highly context-
dependent and it is important to have a clear vision and expectation of the
scale of the evaluation. There is a clear value of field studies; but there is a need
of preceding lab studies as pinpointing sources of problems in field studies is
otherwise challenging.
KEY CHALLENGE #5
Experts voiced that legal, ethical, and budget constraints play a major role in
decisions around whether to conduct field studies in USEC.
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which metrics to investigate and which evaluation method to 
employ for evaluating USEC systems. P2, for example, voiced 
that the variety of evaluation approaches often also leads to 
a wide range of different system evaluations and conclusions.
If you look at five different usable security papers you can’t 
compare them because they have used slightly different 
approaches of evaluating the different parts of their systems [. . .] 
you can’t really say which one was better or worse. - P2 
P2 particularly highlighted the subjectivity of privacy and 
security and that many researchers have strong opinions 
when it comes to the evaluation. P2 also voiced that the lack 
of standardized sets to evaluate security schemes makes it 
even harder to fully address ecological validity and perform 
comparisons between multiple works.
I am not aware of any standard scenarios that can say ‘okay, here 
now we can compare it if we’re running a lab study.’ - P2 
In line with Key Challenge #4, P11 underlined the need for 
a clear vision of what is expected of evaluations that are either 
conducted in lab settings and are likely less ecologically valid, 
or are conducted as organized field studies that are still 
limited to an extent due to research participation effects 
(Nichols & Maner, 2008; Orne, 1962).
We [as a community] just need to be a little bit more open to 
what sort of solutions/evaluations we are expecting out of [some-
thing] that has not actually been deployed in the real world. - P11 
4.5.2. Creating space for novel solutions
P11 expressed that while problem-scoping research, e.g., identi-
fying usability issues in existing systems, is important, it is 
equally important to conduct problem-solving research. Some 
experts also raised the concern that the USEC community is very 
focused on the evaluation part when a large element of the 
contribution is building a system functional enough to demon-
strate effectiveness in terms of both deployment and usability.
The [USEC community] wants to evaluate everything when like 
a big part of your contribution is just the fact that you could build 
this [system]. - P11 
P11 further argued that without recognition of the value of 
functional solutions, which may come with limitations 
imposed by the real world, the community may struggle to 
really engage with the realities of solving problems.
I feel like we as a community refuse to accept that kind of 
contribution – then you know, we’re shooting ourselves in the 
foot, we’re never going to be part of the broader conversation. 
- P11 
Other experts discussed the community’s focus on realistic 
use cases resulting in limited enthusiasm for building spec-
ulative future-oriented solutions. P8 mentioned that they have 
seen some shift recently, but problem-scoping and problem- 
solving USEC research are still not balanced.
I like some of the shift we’ve seen recently [. . .] to actually really 
look at finding ways of supporting [users]. - P8 
Considering the implementation of novel solutions, P11 
argued that there is still a lack of future-oriented USEC 
research where use cases are more speculative or avant-garde.
In general the usable security and privacy security community is 
not very imaginative [. . .] they don’t really like thinking too far in 
the future. - P11 
P10 agreed to some extent and voiced that the USEC com-
munity does not appreciate research where they have to 
imagine worlds that do not exist.
4.5.3. Accessibility and availability of resources
Experts highlighted the lack of open-source material within 
the USEC community that negatively affects their research 
outcome. According to P6 there is a significant lack of 
open-source implementations of usable privacy and security 
systems available. P4 voiced that the lack of open-source 
material makes it time-consuming and challenging to build 
certain features and P11 even suggested to collectively build 
a platform that supports researchers in their research.
How can we create a platform that will make it super easy for 
other researchers to build upon the foundation that you’ve cre-
ated? - P11 
Experts also voiced that their research is often driven by the 
hardware that is available. For example, P2 faced challenges in 
investigating a security system’s usability while users are 
walking.
We had the idea of putting people on a treadmill for the evalua-
tion [. . .] but then didn’t have a treadmill. - P2 
Building upon the sample size discussions in Section 4.3, 
experts also asserted that finding a broad user base is even 
more critical in academia and that this is where most aca-
demic studies suffer because the resources for recruiting are 
limited.
KEY CHALLENGE #6
Experts voiced that aiming for evaluations with high ecological validity is cru-
cial in USEC research; however, they also mentioned that USEC prototype
evaluations are often incapable of achieving high ecological validity.
KEY CHALLENGE #7
Experts voiced that problem-solving research is relatively scarce in recent USEC
research. While problem-scoping lays the foundation for further investigations,
research that implements and evaluates usable privacy and security prototype
solutions is also valuable as voiced by the experts.
KEY CHALLENGE #8
Experts voiced that the current USEC research community does not consistently
support sharing research resources, for example, access to hardware prototypes,
software implementations, and platforms for conducting studies.
10 F. MATHIS ET AL.
4.6. Academia & industry in USEC research
Getting access to real systems used by companies is challen-
ging and the lack of access can result in lower ecological 
validity as well as barriers to transitioning research results 
into practice. For example, one issue in privacy and security 
research is that potential industry partners are concerned 
about harmful findings and do not allow any “vulnerability 
research” (Gamero-Garrido et al., 2017), including prototype- 
building work. P2 related such an incident.
We did have some connections with [companies] but they are 
like: ´you can’t touch our machines.’ - P2 
Experts voiced that this type of research can be of great value, 
but there are concerns over legal challenges. Building upon 
the discussions around USEC’s research culture, we present 
experts’ comments on the lack of collaborations between 
academia and industry (Section 4.6.1) and the resulting lim-
ited real-world impact (Section 4.6.2).
4.6.1. Academia and industry – Status Quo
Experts voiced that although there are collaborations between 
academia and industry, there is still room for improvements 
when it comes to exchanging knowledge, sharing research 
resources, and accelerating impact. Our experts voiced that 
one of the resulting problems is the lack of hardware accessi-
bility (similar to Key Challenge #8) that leads to limited 
research contributions and therefore decreases ecological 
validity: “if they just lent us [an ATM] for a period of time it 
would have been really good to do our studies” (P8). Another 
expert, P7, also brought up the ATM example and the corre-
sponding challenges with financial institutions.
Which bank would allow [to install] some random prototypical 
hardware; probably no bank. - P7 
The lack of access to real-world hardware is only one problem 
according to P8. P8 also voiced that another considerable 
problem is companies’ fear of security leaks that impacts 
usable privacy and security research.
If you are working in the security in an environment where there 
is real-world security, they often won’t let you do any observations 
and I think that’s really bad [. . .] they are afraid that you’re going 
to find something that means the security isn’t working. - P8 
Besides that, researchers are restricted in publishing findings 
based on observations within companies: “I’ve been lucky to 
have done observational studies a couple of times [but] I wasn’t 
allowed to publish them” (P8). The importance of ecological 
validity in USEC underpins the need for more real-world 
studies where users actually use those systems on a daily 
basis. One way to conduct more of these investigations is, 
according to P11, to collaborate closely with industry and 
establish stronger collaborations.
4.6.2. USEC research and its “Real-world” impact
When asking our experts whether or not they see controlled 
lab studies as the “way to go” to evaluate security and privacy- 
protecting systems and what progress they would like to see 
within the USEC community, discussions around the impact 
of USEC research on real-world applications came up and 
that this transition, moving USEC research and corre-
sponding usable privacy and security solutions into prac-
tice, is still lacking. Some experts voiced that the problem is 
not that the USEC community lacks ideas for usable and 
secure systems; instead, they would like to see how these 
systems and solutions fit into real life. P9, for example, 
voiced that many publications end in a heap of privacy 
and security schemes that never find their way into users’ 
daily lives.
There’s a lot of proposed authentication schemes out there and 
a lot of them aren’t gonna move forward like a lot of them are 
ideas, they didn’t really work out, they’re not really showing any 
promise and so you know, we discarded them. - P9 
Although there are technologies that are widely deployed 
nowadays (e.g., anti-phishing technology, two-factor authen-
tication) much of USEC research has indeed not been applied 
in the real world; examples include enhancing authentication 
on mobile devices (Bianchi et al., 2010; Khamis et al., 2017; 
De Luca et al., 2014; Von Zezschwitz et al., 2015) or protect-
ing users’ privacy when interacting with public displays (De 
Luca, Von Zezschwitz, Pichler et al., 2013; Ragozin et al., 
2019; Von Zezschwitz et al., 2015). Our experts voiced that 
a major reason for the limited impact is the huge gap between 
prototype evaluations and being able to use these systems in 
real-world settings: “there’s a huge gap between possibility and 
building the system and commercialization” (P5). 
Complementing this, P8 emphasized that many researchers 
do not want to change their existing theories or their skillset; 
therefore, there seems to exist some kind of resistance to 
change within the USEC community. Our experts also high-
lighted that the interests of USEC researchers and practi-
tioners vary widely. Particularly, some experts were 
concerned about some other USEC experts mindset.
I’ve seen this in rebuttals [. . .] when I write a review about some-
thing [. . .] and they are like oh well so many other people have 
published lab studies, why should I have to go out and do some-
thing differently [. . .] it’s a lot harder, it’s a lot more work and as 
long as I can get this stuff published why should I bother? - P8 
Experts also highlighted that USEC research should go 
beyond publications and not be entirely driven by the “pub-
lish or perish” mindset (McGrail et al., 2006). P11 encouraged 
the USEC community to think big and collaboratively aim for 
more than “little projects.”
How can we make that little project the next like D3.js3 for usable 
security? - P11 
P12 further criticized the opinionated mindset of many 
researchers and that the academic career is often considered 
to be more important than having real-world impact.
Most researchers’ goal is to produce papers and get their degree or 
tenure; few researchers are [actually] building and deploying 
working systems. - P12 
KEY CHALLENGE #9
Experts voiced there is a lack of strong collaborations between academia and
industry and that there seems to exist some kind of resistance to changes within
the USEC community; resulting in limited real-world impact.
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5. Discussion
We have identified 9 key challenges, each of which contri-
butes to answering RQ1: current bottlenecks of USEC 
research that involves prototyping and user studies are mani-
fold and it is challenging to pinpoint a single source (Key 
Challenge #1 – #9). In RQ2, we asked what the USEC com-
munity needs to better transition research contributions to the 
real world. We discuss how our findings contribute to RQ2’s 
answer and provide a discussion of and comparison to similar 
challenges in neighboring HCI disciplines. To conclude, we 
discuss the implications of our work and provide ways for-
ward for both individual researchers and the broader USEC 
community.
5.1. There is no one best way for doing USEC research
Our experts noted that it is impossible to enumerate all 
security aspects of a system but that imperfectly prototyped 
and evaluated systems can still have value and inspire the 
direction of USEC’s future. Arguably, the opinions brought 
up by our experts around the design, development, and eva-
luation of prototype systems are not far away from the HCI 
literature. Greenberg and Buxton (2008) and Shneiderman 
et al. (2016) emphasized that the choice of evaluation meth-
odology should evolve from the actual problem (e.g., what are 
users’ needs) and appropriate research questions. In the con-
text of usable security, it is also important to note here that 
a system’s usability and security oftentimes highly depends on 
the specific context (e.g., external factors can impact 
a system’s state or a user’s behavior (Kainda et al., 2010)). 
The value, benefits, and drawbacks of different evaluation 
methods were echoed by our interviewees together with the 
non-trivial part of threat modeling (Key Challenge #1 and #4). 
Below, we discuss our experts’ voiced comments in more 
detail and tie those back to the broader research field.
5.1.1. Adjusting expectations of prototype developments 
and evaluations
According to some of the experts (e.g., see P12’s statement in 
Section 4.5.1 or P11’s statements in Section 4.5.1 & 4.5.2), the 
problem is exacerbated by some researchers’ expectation of an 
exhaustive evaluation that assesses every single aspect of 
a system’s characteristics in an ecologically valid setting. 
There are many reasons that make this often infeasible when 
evaluating novel systems, including: 1) the need to run lab 
studies first to evaluate the new elements in the prototype and 
pinpoint causes of problems and 2) not having the resources 
(e.g., hardware) to produce multiple prototypes for in-the- 
wild testing. The voiced hardware prototyping and ecological 
validity challenges (Key Challenge #2 and #6) voiced by our 
experts can also be found in neighboring research commu-
nities such as Ubicomp. Prototyping novel ubiquitous systems 
is challenging (Dix et al., 2003; Greenberg & Fitchett, 2001) 
and often requires additional expertise and specific tools (e.g., 
knowledge about different electronic components, access to 
soldering irons). Greenberg and Fitchett (2001) even 
described developing and combining physical devices and 
interfacing them within the application software as one of 
the biggest obstacles. In a similar vein to the lack of sharing 
research resources and expertise in building hardware voiced 
by our experts (Key Challenge #2 and #8), Greenberg and 
Fitchett (2001) observed that researchers who develop systems 
based on physical devices are often required to start from 
scratch and face many difficulties. In their own little project, 
building a reactive media space environment, one of their 
colleagues (an electrical engineer) joined the team and pro-
vided significant support in the hardware-building process 
(Greenberg & Fitchett, 2001). More than ten years later, we 
can indeed see similar interdisciplinary collaborations in 
USEC research. One example is the Back-of-Device prototype 
by De Luca et al. (2013) and their follow up work XSide (De 
Luca et al., 2014). The form factor of their first prototype 
significantly reduced the generalizability of the results of one- 
handed interaction. While Greenberg and Fitchett (2001) 
benefited greatly from an electrical engineer that joined the 
project, the prototype by De Luca et al. (2014) benefited 
greatly from the 3D printing expertise of one of the research-
ers; thus improved, together with an advanced algorithm, user 
experience.
This shows that collaborations can greatly improve USEC 
prototype systems and corresponding evaluations. As empha-
sized by Fléchais and Faily (2010), usable privacy and security 
research requires a variety of researchers from different 
research areas beyond USEC (e.g., psychology, economics), 
which we discuss further in Section 5.4.2. The voiced proto-
type-related challenges (e.g., Key Challenge #2 and #6) also 
suggest that expectations of prototype developments and eva-
luations should be adjusted in situations where building “per-
fect” prototypes and conducting highly realistic evaluations 
are too challenging.
5.1.2. Bridging the gap between lab and field studies
The USEC community has been debating the respective value 
of lab and field studies for some time, with our experts 
similarly mentioning the need to be open to alternative eva-
luation approaches (Key Challenge #2 and #6). Discussions 
around lab and field studies, especially when and how field 
studies are “worth the hassle” are also discussed in neighbor-
ing communities such as Mobile HCI (Kjeldskov & Skov, 
2014). A corresponding critical evaluation and comparison 
of a lab and field study even impacted the Mobile HCI 
research field in the subsequent years (Kjeldskov & Skov, 
2014; Kjeldskov et al., 2004). Kjeldskov et al. (2004) discov-
ered more usability issues in the lab than in a similar field 
study, for roughly half the cost; consequently, the researchers 
concluded that the added value of field studies is very little 
and neglectable, which resulted in a heated debate about the 
generalizability as the study did not cover long-term use and 
adoption (Iachello & Terrenghi, 2005).
In USEC research, the long-term use and evaluation of 
systems is indeed an important component. For example, 
previous works showed that habituation can impact users’ 
perception and security behavior (e.g., see the replication 
study of CMU’s SSL study (Sotirakopoulos et al., 2011; 
Sunshine et al., 2009)). Other works also emphasized the 
importance of habituation and its key role in USEC research 
(e.g., in classification of genuine login attempts (Syed et al., 
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2011) or in research on security alert dialogs (Maurer et al., 
2011)). That being said, Greenberg and Buxton (2008), for 
example, assert that there is a need to recognize many other 
appropriate ways to evaluate and validate work and that 
usability evaluations can be ineffective if naively done “by 
rule” rather than “by thought” and that “a combination of 
methods – from empirical to non-empirical to reflective – will 
likely help triangulate and enrich the discussion of a system’s 
validity.” (Greenberg & Buxton, 2008).
In USEC, there seems to be a need to fundamentally 
rethink current study paradigms (Alt & Von Zezschwitz, 
2019) and frameworks for understanding privacy risks and 
solutions in personalization systems (Toch et al., 2012). For 
example, the uptake of smart speakers that could collect 
sensitive data about users (e.g., (Alrawais et al., 2017; Lau 
et al., 2018; Toch et al., 2012)) requires a change in the way 
current security and privacy prototype systems are designed 
and evaluated.
There have been suggestions to improve ecological validity 
of usability and security evaluations in the lab. For example, 
role-playing real-world situations (Fahl et al., 2013) to mimic 
scenarios where security is a secondary task (which is usually 
the case in the real world (A. M. Sasse et al., 2001)). However, 
it has also been argued that these approaches can not neces-
sarily compete with the ecological validity of real-world stu-
dies and should therefore not be treated as an alternative. As 
voiced by our experts, the context and expectation of the 
corresponding evaluation method is important and USEC 
research needs all facets of evaluation methods, including 
studies of different types beyond traditional lab and field 
studies. While preceding lab studies and follow up field stu-
dies are vital to transition usable privacy and security proto-
type systems into practice in the long run, alternative 
evaluation methods are equally important and can inspire 
usable privacy and security research in the future.
A potential direction to address the challenges around 
ecological validity is to leverage novel technologies for proto-
type development, deployment, and evaluation. As brought up 
by one of our experts (see also Section 5.4.3), 3D printing can 
significantly facilitate prototyping of security systems and 
USEC research in general (as evidenced by, for example, De 
Luca et al. (2014); Marky et al. (2020)). Future work could 
also consider the use of online platforms to facilitate field 
studies. For example, Redmiles et al. (2018) showed that 
many insights from online surveys on security and privacy 
translate to the real world. In line with Redmiles et al. (2018), 
Mazurek et al. (2013) suggest that passwords collected 
through online studies can be a reasonable proxy for real- 
world passwords. Similar to the transition of lab to online 
studies, there has also been a movement in human-centered 
research to use virtual and augmented reality to conduct user- 
centered evaluations of, for example, authentication schemes, 
IoT devices, and public displays (Mäkelä et al., 2020; Mathis, 
Vaniea et al., 2021; Voit et al., 2019). Mathis, Vaniea, et al. 
(2021) showed that virtual reality (VR) can serve as a suitable 
test bed for the usability and security evaluation of real-world 
authentication schemes. In a similar vein, Mäkelä et al. (2020) 
reported that user behavior is largely similar in field studies of 
public displays compared to behavior in immersive virtual 
reality, while Voit et al. (2019) compared conducting empiri-
cal studies online, in virtual reality, in augmented reality, in 
the lab, and in in-situ studies to find that some findings are 
comparable across them while others are not. Following P11’s 
emphasis on aiming for something beyond little projects, 
building an online platform that is capable of evaluating 
physical privacy and security systems in an ecologically valid 
way could be a powerful approach to establish an infrastruc-
ture for USEC research that may be complementary to lab and 
field studies.
One key message here is that we as a research community 
should be mindful of the challenges that USEC researchers 
encounter when evaluating usable privacy and security pro-
totype systems. There is often great value and depth in 
findings from lab studies. It is also important to note that 
novel technologies and evaluation methods can augment 
USEC research in the long run (e.g., the previously discussed 
3D printing examples by De Luca et al. 2014, and Marky et al. 
2020 or using VR as a test-bed Mathis, Vaniea, et al., 2021). It 
is without question that field studies are essential for high 
ecological validity; however, sometimes they are infeasible due 
to constraints beyond researchers’ capabilities due to lack of 
resources or the nature of the prototype (e.g., evaluating 
a tethered hardware prototype). In these cases, field studies 
can take place only if the prototype features much higher 
fidelity than what can be achieved in typical research 
environments.
5.2. Selecting sample sizes in the presence of constraints
A major discussion point in our interviews was about sample 
sizes and selection processes (Key Challenge #3), which is 
a major domain challenge in USEC research (Garfinkel & 
Lipford, 2014; Redmiles et al., 2017). Looking at the content 
of the neighboring HCI community, we see a wide range of 
sample sizes and compositions used. For example, Caine high-
lighted that twelve participants was the most common sample 
size across papers published in CHI 2014 (Caine, 2016). 
Focusing on usability only, Turner et al. (2006) found that 
five users allow discovering 80% of a system’s usability pro-
blems. Similarly to our experts’ concerns about the way parti-
cipant recruitment happens in their USEC research (e.g., “we 
evaluate [our systems] by knocking on the doors of friends and 
colleagues and be like ‘hey, come do my user study”’ (P11), 
Lazar et al. (2017) argued that there are many HCI studies 
that come with a small and non-diverse sample (e.g., students 
only); therefore, often do not allow generalizing results. We 
discuss the “correct” sample size selection and its reality 
further in Section 5.2.1 and 5.2.2.
5.2.1. “Correct” sample size selection
Classically the “correct” way to decide on a sample size is 
highly dependent on the research question and the type of 
data being collected (Lazar et al., 2017; Redmiles et al., 2017). 
For example, qualitative studies that focus on ground-up 
approaches use the concept of “saturation” (Guest et al., 
2006), where data is collected till the uncovered insights 
start saturating, i.e., increasing the sample size does not reveal 
additional insights. Saturation is an interesting approach 
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because sample size is decided while the research is ongoing 
rather than up-front, making it challenging to know at the 
start how many participants will be needed. Quantitative 
studies that involve statistical testing use a very different 
approach. The number of needed participants is calculated 
up-front using information like expected variance to perform 
a power analysis computation of how many subjects are 
required to reach statistical significance (Field & Hole, 2002; 
Yatani, 2016). However, this often clashes with the realities of 
finding and conducting experiments with users.
Redmiles et al. (2017) emphasized the importance of dif-
ferent sampling methods in different research contexts and 
the need to rely on some form of convenience sampling due 
to, for example, time and cost considerations. Sample compo-
sition is also an issue since some groups, like security engi-
neers, penetration testers, and chief security officers, are not 
necessarily easy to get time with. Yet, targeting populations 
like this even at low sample numbers may be the most appro-
priate approach to answer a specific research question 
(Redmiles et al., 2017). The tension harks back to the initial 
attempts by Nielsen (1994) to find valid ways of conducting 
usability tests in low-budget environments, such as universi-
ties. Approaches like Think Aloud (Nielsen, 1994) and Delphi 
(Loo, 2002) studies were specifically designed to extract the 
maximum amount of usability data from small samples. 
USEC research has some unique properties that make the 
application of these approaches challenging for prototype 
testing, namely that security is often a secondary task 
(Cranor & Garfinkel, 2005; Garfinkel & Lipford, 2014) 
where users’ main goal is likely something other than the 
prototype’s security function. Since many of the “discount” 
usability approaches focus on having the user engage with the 
tested system as a primary task, they are challenging to fully 
adapt to USEC (Kainda et al., 2010).
5.2.2. “Realities” of sample size selections
Our experts voiced that for human-centered privacy and 
security evaluations and corresponding sample sizes and 
selections there exist many different opinions within the 
USEC community. P3, for example, argued that a sample 
size of 12–20 users for security evaluations is too small to 
have any value. There are indeed published works that come 
with noticeable large sample sizes. For example, Ur et al. 
(2017) conducted an online study with N = 4509 participants 
to detail the security and usability impact of a password 
meter’s design dimensions, Cheon et al. (2020) assessed and 
evaluated a security framework in large crowd-sourced online 
studies (N = 2619 and N = 4000), and Markert et al. (Markert 
et al., 2020) conducted an online study to analyze the security 
of smartphone unlock PINs with N = 1220 participants.
At the same time, security evaluations of published work at 
top USEC venues such as ACM CHI (Das et al., 2017; Khamis 
et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2010; De Luca et al., 2014; De Luca, 
Von Zezschwitz, Nguyen et al., 2013; Von Zezschwitz et al., 
2015) and USENIX SOUPS (Krombholz et al., 2016; De Luca 
et al., 2009; Tari et al., 2006) studied noticeable smaller sam-
ples. On top of that, some security evaluations are even based 
on a single expert attacker (Bianchi et al., 2011a; Krombholz 
et al., 2016; De Luca et al., 2009; De Luca, Von Zezschwitz, 
Nguyen et al., 2013) or on a small sample of trained partici-
pants who were put in the role of attackers (Abdrabou, 
Khamis, Eisa, Ismail & Elmougy, 2019; Bianchi et al., 2011b; 
Khamis et al., 2018). The previously mentioned works show 
the wide range of acceptable participant numbers within 
USEC and how much that acceptance varies across sub- 
domains, resulting in no single rule about how many partici-
pants and what type of participants (e.g., experts, novices) are 
needed. Taking shoulder surfing as an example, the spectrum 
of study designs results in a wide range of types of findings, 
impacts on the validity, and limits the ability of researchers to 
compare results and systems (Bošnjak & Brumen, 2020; Wiese 
& Roth, 2015).
The message here is that working collectively toward a 
research standard or a set of roughly defined guidelines 
could be beneficial for both individual researchers and the 
USEC research community as a whole. This could help the 
USEC community to a) support early career researchers in 
their usable privacy and security research decisions (e.g., 
which sampling method to apply? how many participants? 
against which threat should the system protect users?) and 
b) facilitate comparisons between works.
5.2.3. The quest to find (many) participants
As shown in, for example, the USEC works by Aviv et al. 
(2018), Cheon et al. (2020), Felt et al. (2014), and Harbach 
et al. (2014), and Markert et al. (2020), an approach that 
facilitates achieving large sample sizes is to use crowd- 
sourcing online platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk 
or establishing university-industry collaborations that allow 
the investigation of security systems at larger scales. Yet, the 
deployment and corresponding evaluation of usable privacy 
and security prototypes still remains a challenge. Online ser-
vices are often not suitable to, for example, evaluate hardware- 
based prototypes or prototypes for platforms that participants 
do not own (e.g., phones with a touch-sensitive rear De Luca, 
Von Zezschwitz, Nguyen et al., 2013, smart glasses Winkler 
et al., 2015, VR headsets Mathis, Williamson et al., 2021).
In line with the suggestions in Section 5.1.2, our key 
message and a future research direction here is to investigate 
alternative platforms for conducting research that can bal-
ance a) reaching out to a large number of participants, and 
b) delivering realistic experiences to ensure high ecological 
validity. A further direction to address this as a community is 
to facilitate and encourage collaborations across researchers. 
For example, one of the major concerns voiced by our experts 
is the lack of resources or research infrastructure to allow 
them to reach out to many participants, such as limited 
funding to compensate participants, conduct online studies, 
or purchase needed hardware (Key Challenge #2). Sharing 
research resources across research groups, such as prototype 
systems, evaluation equipment, procedures, and evaluation 
platforms would benefit the USEC community as a whole. 
Other fields make their resources available for collaborators. 
For example, chemistry and physics labs share their research 
equipment with other groups, and arrange research visits to 
allow their collaborators to leverage their unique equipment 
(Wolfgang Glänzel, 2001). This is often done in return for 
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sharing results, intellectual property rights or co-authorship of 
research outputs which is a win-win for everyone involved.
Finding a suitable sample is crucial for evaluations that 
should take place before taking USEC concepts to the real 
world, and thus the suggestions above contribute to answering 
RQ2 (“What does the USEC community need to better facil-
itate the transition of artifact contributions into practice?”). We 
discuss the potential impact of encouraging collaborations in 
USEC further in Section 5.4.2.
5.3. Problem-scoping and problem-solving
To further answer RQ2, we refer to Figure 1 to make results 
more tangible. Note that the figure is based on experts’ state-
ments and our interpretation of the conducted interviews 
(Key Challenges #1 – #9). To this end, we distinguish 
between: ➊ the real world, ➋ problem-scoping research, and 
➌ problem-solving research. USEC research puts a strong 
emphasis on problem-scoping research (e.g., Balebako et al. 
(2013), De Luca et al. (2010), Harbach, De Luca, Egelman 
et al. (2016), Harbach et al. (2014), Inglesant and Sasse (2010), 
Leon et al. (2013), and Mare et al. (2016), and Markert et al. 
(2020), and Nguyen et al. (2019), and Redmiles (2019)) where, 
for example, users’ behavior is observed to identify privacy 
and security issues. The generated knowledge is then used to 
inform, teach, and protect people (Althobaiti et al., 2018; 
Canova et al., 2014; Kirlappos & Sasse, 2012). However, 
some of our experts voiced there is relatively less progress in 
leveraging these findings to also develop novel privacy- 
protecting and security solutions and, more importantly, facil-
itate their transition into practice.
Balancing both research directions has the potential to 
result in noticeable real-world impact in the long run. P11 
emphasized the importance of investing in problem-solving 
because otherwise, as they put it: “we’re shooting ourselves in 
the foot and never going to be part of the broader conversa-
tion.” The USEC community clearly values how systems are 
used, not just how they are built, so while problem-solving 
needs more emphasis (Key Challenge #7), it should not be at 
the expense of proper usability, privacy, and security evalua-
tions. Conducting human-centered studies should be an inte-
gral part of the evaluation of usable privacy and security 
systems rather than just “box ticking,” and should be 
integrated at an early stage of the process. That being said, 
while some communities appreciate innovative solutions even 
if they lack in-depth user evaluations, a novel privacy or 
security system that is not usable will not be secure; if 
a system is not usable, users will work around it or misuse 
it, resulting in poor privacy and security (Adams & Sasse, 
1999; Whitten & Tygar, 1999). Besides users’ perceived ease 
of use and social benefits that can influence users’ adoption 
decision, the potential risks associated to other users’ privacy 
also play an important role in the likelihood of use and 
adoption of ubiquitous systems (Rauschnabel et al., 2016).
The message here is that it is important to collectively 
understand what the people who are finally going to use the 
systems need before building many different prototype 
systems that end in publications but do not contribute to 
the bigger picture: transition research into practice and 
provide users with usable privacy and security systems. 
While spotting users’ privacy and security issues is essential, 
it is equally important to integrate these findings into an 
iterative research process and build solutions that eventually 
find their way into practice and solve some of those issues. 
This would also foster collaborations between researchers who 
conduct problem-scoping research and those who conduct 
problem-solving research, and would eventually close the 
loop depicted in Figure 1.
5.4. Open research and collaborations to mitigate 
challenges
There is a number of ways in which collaborations can help 
address some of the named challenges.
5.4.1. Accessibility of research material
The segregation of research material (e.g., prototypes) from 
publications is common and makes reproducibility and com-
parisons challenging (Sugrim et al., 2019; Vines et al., 2014; 
Wicherts et al., 2006). While individual researchers of the HCI 
and security communities are gradually implementing ele-
ments of the Open Science movement (Innovation, 2016), 
there are still many contributions that are often not publicly 
available. A recent CHI paper by Wacharamanotham et al. 
Figure 1. The schematic figure represents a substantial part of conducted work in USEC with a focus on usable privacy and security prototype systems. Dotted orange 
lines indicate underdeveloped links and solid blue lines strong links.
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(2020) shows that sharing artifacts is uncommon in HCI 
research, with percentages between 14% for raw selective 
data (e.g., notes during ethnographic studies) and 47% for 
hardware (e.g., 3D designs, circuit diagrams). This lack of 
accessibility makes it challenging to build on previous works 
or compare findings. The USEC community can encourage 
this by setting guidelines that encourage open source (e.g., 
sharing 3D models or circuit diagrams of prototypes), includ-
ing their accessibility as a criteria for acceptance, or make 
additions to the reviewing process through, for example, the 
inclusion of badges (Kay et al., 2017; Kidwell et al., 2016). This 
would help mitigate Key Challenge #8. However, it is equally 
important to take a look at the reasons for not sharing 
research material. There are situations where researchers 
face restrictions that are beyond their capabilities. For exam-
ple, as reported by Wacharamanotham et al. (2020), the top 
two reasons for not sharing research data are (1) the sensitiv-
ity of data and (2) the lack of permission. Wacharamanotham 
et al. (2020) even found that sharing research artifacts may 
sometimes even be prohibited by researchers’ respective insti-
tutional review board (IRB) or ethics board. Restrictions 
introduced by institutional regulations or industry partners 
should not, at any point, disadvantage individual researchers 
and restrict them from publishing their research. While Open 
Science is important, it is also important to note that properly 
preparing all elements of the research for public consumption 
requires a lot of time, and is less rewarded in academia 
compared to conducting research and publishing papers 
(McGrail et al., 2006). Whether or not the act of “publishing 
papers” should be researchers’ core task is another question, 
one that our experts have only partially touched (see 
Section 4.6.2).
5.4.2. Collaborations across research groups
Our experts emphasized that interdisciplinary research could 
contribute to addressing the lack of resources and the faced 
hardware challenges when developing novel USEC prototypes 
(Key Challenge #2 and #8). P8 highlighted the need and value 
of “collaborations between usable security people and the peo-
ple who are close to building [systems] and can create different 
variants” (P8). It has to be said that there are successful 
collaborations across research groups that resulted in fruitful 
privacy and security research, with the privacy icon research 
by Cranor and Schaub (2020), now used by California law 
(Tkacik, 2020), as one of the most recent examples that 
involved researchers from different universities with different 
backgrounds including privacy, software, and law research. In 
a similar vein, when it comes to usable privacy and security 
prototypes and their evaluation, one way to mitigate the 
challenges of reaching out to participants could be by estab-
lishing strong collaborations among research groups. For 
example, if a consortium of research groups collectively builds 
an infrastructure that facilitates participant recruitment, it 
would help the involved researchers and the USEC commu-
nity as a whole. Looking at more distributed models of parti-
cipant recruitment, including potential access to target- 
specific, hard-to-reach user groups, and establishing an infra-
structure that allows sharing research equipment could also 
help mitigate Key Challenge #8.
5.4.3. Engagement with industry and transition to practice
Our experts voiced that building hardware prototypes is chal-
lenging and is often out of their expertise. P8, for example, 
highlighted that the USEC community needs more collabora-
tions with prototype-building experts. Sometimes the industry 
is better equipped to build prototypes, or has resources (e.g., 
possibility of reaching millions of users (Felt et al., 2014)) that 
researchers in academia do not posses. Among the successful 
examples in the USEC community is Felt et al. (2014) who 
collaborated with Google to collect data based on 130,754 user 
interactions, which would have been challenging using aca-
demic resources only. However, it is important to note here 
that university-industry collaborations can be complex and 
introduce further challenges (e.g., bureaucracy or the inflex-
ibility of universities (Schofield, 2013)) that may impact the 
success of such collaborations (Rybnicek & Königsgruber, 
2019). The lack of transition into practice (Key Challenge 
#9) is according to our experts also attributable to the mind- 
set of many researchers – “publish or perish” (McGrail et al., 
2006), which leads to many prototype systems that are suffi-
cient for user studies and publications, but not necessarily 
deployable in a real-world setting. While the transition of 
USEC prototype systems into practice has been endorsed by 
our experts, it is also important to revisit the fundamental 
idea of prototyping in human-centered research. While pro-
viding users with both usable and secure systems is one of the 
primary goals of USEC research, and therefore, it seems to be 
important to transition USEC prototype systems into practice, 
USEC research is much more. Focusing solely on the transi-
tion into practice would greatly undermine USEC’s goals. In 
a broader sense, as put by Garfinkel and Lipford (2014):
The goal of academic research in usable security should be to help 
speed the discovery (and therefore the adoption) of techniques 
that simultaneously improve both usability and security. - 
(Garfinkel & Lipford, 2014, p. 4) 
In USEC research, it is often both: transitioning usable and 
secure systems into practice but also using the research 
around the prototype for educational purposes and to facil-
itate learning. The prototype system by De Luca et al. (2013), 
for example, can be interpreted as a novel authentication 
method with the aim to become a product, or it can be 
construed as a system built to evaluate how usable and secure 
authentication can be if we integrate the back of a device for 
user authentication.
There are also prototype systems that were not built to 
transition into practice, but rather to shed light on users’ 
perception of different authentication concepts on doors 
(Mecke et al., 2018) or on mobile devices (Prange et al., 
2020). USEC researchers have also built prototype systems 
to investigate the extent to which security systems from 
mobile devices can be adapted for virtual reality applications 
(George et al., 2017) or to study the impact of different input 
techniques and threat models on users’ security (Mathis, 
Williamson, et al., 2021). In these cases, the primary research 
goal is not necessarily to transition the prototype into practice 
but rather to make significant contributions to USEC’s 
research field, facilitate learning, and inspire potential future 
research. In fact, experts also voiced that industry 
16 F. MATHIS ET AL.
involvement and collaborations are required to transform 
early usable privacy and security systems into actual deploy-
able systems. The lack of transition into practice is indeed also 
a key challenge in Ubicomp research (Caceres & Friday, 2012; 
Davies & Gellersen, 2002). Shneiderman (2016) emphasized 
the importance of collaborations and that we all should com-
bine practical problems with the development of theory 
because each supports and drives the other.
In a similar vein, USEC research involves both problem- 
scoping and problem-solving USEC research that is often trea-
ted independent of each other and seems to be not balanced 
(Section 5.3 and Key Challenge #7). As also mentioned by 
Fléchais and Faily (2010), one way the USEC community 
could foster collaborations between academia and industry is 
by introducing industry tracks to conferences, and creating 
forums that bring USEC researchers together with potential 
industry partners (e.g., DS34). To further spark interest in 
usable privacy and security research and emphasize its rele-
vance, additional conference-independent online events (e.g., 
tutorials, seminars) similar to, for example, the Quarterly 
Workshop on Security Information Workers5 could be orga-
nized. This would contribute toward mitigating Key 
Challenge #5 and #9. Engagement with industry could also 
help to overcome some of experts’ voiced legal and ethical 
constraints (e.g., having access to specific study settings). 
Ethical and legal considerations are a fundamental part of 
usable privacy and security research (e.g., see the security 
field study of ATM use by De Luca et al. (2010)). That 
being said, Ethics also forms one of the seven HCI grand 
challenges (Stephanidis et al., 2019) and is a vital component 
of modern research in general (Yip et al., 2016).
6. Concluding remarks
Although some of our key challenges are more relevant to 
USEC (e.g., threat modeling, USEC’s research culture), many 
issues USEC experts face when designing, prototyping, and 
evaluating usable privacy and security systems can also be 
found in neighboring research communities such as HCI, 
Mobile HCI, Ubicomp. Is this surprising? No, not at all. 
While the birth of usable privacy and security happened 
around 1995 with the works by Zurko and Simon (1996), 
Whitten and Tygar (1999), Adams and Sasse (1999), and 
Jermyn et al. (1999), the first formal gathering of the USEC 
community can indeed be traced back to a workshop at a non 
security-focused venue: ACM CHI 2003 (Andrew et al., 2003). 
The history of usable privacy and security research, including 
the way in which the USEC community has been established 
and our experts’ voiced challenges, shows that USEC research 
does not exist in a vacuum. In fact, usable privacy and security 
has borrowed many research methods from the HCI commu-
nity and neighboring communities (Garfinkel & Lipford, 
2014). Johnston et al. (2003), for example, used and refined 
the ten usability heuristics by Nielsen (2005) to promote and 
enable security awareness of users when interacting with 
computer systems. HCI as a discipline has established many 
more widely-used guidelines, toolkits, and processes to incor-
porate usability into products at an early stage such as the 
seven stages of action by Norman (1988) or the eight golden 
rules of interface design by Shneiderman and Plaisant (2010). 
The inherently interdisciplinary nature of usable privacy and 
security and the challenges around security evaluations, threat 
modeling, and ecological validity, and the lack of strong links 
between problem-scoping and problem-solving USEC 
research (see Figure 1) make usable privacy and security 
research unique, hard, and often impedes the transition of 
USEC systems into practice. As put by Fléchais and Faily 
(2010):
Progress in usable security research and design has been slow, due 
in part to the need to master a large amount of (usually) mutually 
exclusive, yet necessary, skills and knowledge.- (Fléchais & Faily, 
2010, p. 1) 
By synthesizing opinions from USEC experts that have not 
seen in-depth discussions in prior literature, and raising 
awareness of the challenges when prototyping and evaluating 
usable privacy and security systems, we hope to provide 
a common starting point for ongoing discussions within the 
USEC community.
6.1. Lessons learned and ways forward
To summarize the lessons learned from our work, we outline five 
ways forward that can be tackled on the individual researcher level 
together with community efforts to strengthen the links between 
problem-scoping research, problem-solving research, and the real 
world, highlighted in Figure 1: 
1) consider different evaluation methods and be realistic 
about what conclusions can be made from each 
paradigm;
2) establish new evaluation paradigms to cope with the 
challenges outlined above with representative samples;
3) consider how we, on a researcher and USEC community 
level, can establish procedures and structures that 
strengthen collaborations across academics and between 
academic research labs and industry;
4) share research resources (e.g., making prototypes open 
source) and enable other researchers to access research 
data (e.g., raw data from studies) to increase the 
research impact in the long run; and
5) balance a) problem-scoping and b) problem-solving USEC 
research with proper user-centered evaluations.
7. Conclusion
A substantial part of usable privacy and security is to iteratively 
design, implement, and evaluate prototype systems that address 
usability, security, and privacy. However, providing users with 
prototypes that are usable while also fulfilling their privacy or 
security objectives is still a major challenge. In this work, we 
reported on twelve semi-structured interviews with established 
and nascent researchers from academia and industry who have 
published research that evaluates usable privacy and security 
prototypes in human-centered studies. We synthesized their opi-
nions of challenges encountered when conducting this type of 
research, discussed the challenges in the light of neighboring 
communities, and identified five ways forward researchers and 
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the USEC community as a whole can pursue to mitigate these 
challenges.
Notes
1. Open Wonderland enables researchers to build interactive and 
multi-user virtual worlds (http://www.openwonderland.org/ 
http://www.openwonderland.org/, accessed 08/03/2021)
2. Two exemplary blog posts about being successful in academia and 








3. Bostock et al. (2011) presented data-driven documents (D3) as 
a novel approach for visualizations at IEEE Transactions on 
Visualization and Computer Graphics in 2011. Originating from 
research conducted at Stanford University, D3.js found its way 
into web development and is nowadays a library for data-driven 
visualizations and used by many developers.
4. The Developing Secure Systems Summit (DS3, https://ds3summit. 
github.io/https://ds3summit.github.io/, accessed 06/03/2021) 
seeks to establish a new meeting ground for researchers and 
practitioners from software industry, academia, research labs, 
and governments.
5. The WSIW workshop (https://wsiw.sec.uni-hannover.de/https:// 
wsiw.sec.uni-hannover.de/, accessed 06/03/2021) is a quarterly 
event and aims to develop and stimulate discussion about security 
information worker.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Interview Invitation
We asked USEC experts if they are willing to be interviewed about their research and included links to several of their research papers that we 
identified in the review described in Section 3.1.
Appendix B. Semi-structured Interview Questions 
(1) Typical Research Journey from Idea to Publication
(a) Let us consider a novel security or privacy-preserving system: If we walk along the path, from an initial idea to the final publication, how would 
these steps look like?
(b) With a focus on each specific step: What are challenges or limitations that you encountered when designing, implementing, and evaluating such 
prototype systems?
(2) Research Challenges and Limitations
(a) Were there limitations that you encountered when iteratively designing, implementing, and evaluating prototype systems?
(b) What were the most challenging parts when developing [experts’ prototype system]? Were there any limitations or things you would have 
preferred to do differently but could not do so?
(c) What are your thoughts regarding the approaches USEC researchers apply to evaluate privacy and security?
(3) The Ecological Validity of Current Evaluations
(a) Do you see controlled lab studies as the “way to go” to evaluate security and privacy-aware prototype systems?
(b) What are your thoughts on the different study types (e.g., lab, online, or in-the-wild studies) USEC researchers currently apply to assess 
a prototype system’s privacy/security and usability?
(c) What keeps USEC researchers and practitioners away from investigating security and privacy-aware systems in more realistic contexts (e.g., at 
a public space such as a bus station)?
(d) Would you prefer to see “more realistic” studies, for example, field studies? Can you please outline why or why not you think so?
(e) Talking about the ecological validity of human-centered evaluations: What conditions have in your opinion a significant influence on the 
validity of research findings?
(f) Let’s assume you have the time and resources available to re-run parts of your [papers study] again. Would there be anything you would like to 
investigate in addition to the metrics you have already mentioned in your publications?
Figure A1. Our interview request included an introduction of our research group, example papers of the expert, and an attached information sheet. Note that we 
censored specific parts in the e-mail for anonymity reasons.
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